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Abstract
In open railway markets, coordinating train schedules at an interchange station requires
negotiation between two independent train operating companies to resolve their operational
conflicts. This paper models the stakeholders as software agents and proposes an agent negotiation
model to study their interaction. Three negotiation strategies have been devised to represent the
possible objectives of the stakeholders, and they determine the behavior in proposing offers to the
proponent. Empirical simulation results confirm that the use of the proposed negotiation strategies
lead to outcomes that are consistent with the objectives of the stakeholders.
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1.

Introduction
Modern railways have been embracing new opportunities and challenges ever since the

introduction of open access. In open railway markets, the responsibilities of infrastructure provision
and train operation are distributed to independent stakeholders. This has led to an infrastructure
manager (IM) selling track capacity to a group of competing train operating companies (TOCs). By
restructuring the conventional railway markets through disintegration (hence enabling competition),
regulatory agencies anticipate improvement on the operational efficiency in their railway markets so
that rail transportation is more responsive to market demands.
One approach to achieve the above objective is to promote seamless services. The availability of
a direct transportation from source to destination is essential to compete with the door-to-door and
1

just-in-time services offered by road transportation. Consequently, removing barriers for seamless
services becomes a key issue, especially in Australia and European countries where trains travel
across jurisdictional boundaries. The attention on interoperability between railway markets can be
realized from the National Competition Policy (of Australia) (BTRE, 2003) and the European Rail
Directive 91/440/EEC (EC, 2006). However, barriers with respect to technical, corporate,
jurisdictional and cultural interoperability have been identified as major impediments in promoting
seamless services (Mulley and Nelson, 1997). While providing solutions for these barriers is a
long-term process, the availability of coordinated train services between different TOCs facilitates
the transportation across regions. In addition, even when seamless services are available,
coordinated services can still compete with seamless services by providing an alternative choice for
consumers.
As passengers are often discouraged by excessive waiting time during transit, schedule
coordination mainly aims to reduce the passenger waiting time at interchange stations. This problem
is not novel in railways, and it has been extensively modeled and examined in conventional railway
markets. Minimization of waiting time is usually obtained by adjusting the commencement time of
two services so that headways and traveling times are preserved to avoid degrading the quality of
service of individual lines (Brucker et al., 1990; Burkard, 1986; Nachtigall, 1996; Nachtigall and
Voget, 1996). In these studies, when coordinating schedules at a single station, the arrival times of a
line at the station have been modeled by a set of vertices of a polygon within a unit circle (Brucker
et al., 1990; Burkard, 1986). The problem is then to minimize the total arc lengths between the
vertices on the circumference of the circle. On the other hand, when coordinating a set of trains at
multiple interchange stations, the problem has been shown to be NP-hard (a problem yet to be
solved deterministically in polynomial time), and it has been solved using a branch-and-bound
algorithm (Nachtigall, 1996) or a genetic algorithm (Nachtigall and Voget, 1996).
Despite the effort of coordinating schedules in conventional markets, the introduction of open
access has altered the nature of the problem. Firstly, railway lines are now operated by multiple
2

TOCs instead of a single authority. As a result, the alignment of schedules requires a mutual
agreement from more than one party, whose operating constraints may be in conflict with those of
the others. In addition, sensitive data, such as cost rates, are unlikely to be revealed, which means
decisions are often made without complete information. Moreover, instead of generating a single
solution (i.e. the optimal solution), the operators are now required to generate a set of offers for the
negotiation process. Remodeling of the schedule coordination problem is thus essential to capture
these new characteristics as a result of open access.
Multi-agent systems are particularly suitable for representing distributed problems as systems of
software agents that are capable of social-like interactions such as negotiation (Jennings and
Bussmann, 2003). Agent modeling has found many applications in transportation systems (Böcker
et al., 2001; Teodorović, 2003; Tsang and Ho, 2004, 2006a, b, 2008; Zhang et al. 2004). In open
railway markets, a multi-agent system was proposed to capture the distributed nature and
negotiation behavior (Tsang and Ho, 2006a). Further, the negotiation between an IM and a single
TOC for track access rights allocation was modeled and examined in details (Tsang and Ho, 2004,
2006a, 2008). A preliminary study (Tsang and Ho, 2006b) on schedule coordination was also
performed. The study employed a simple negotiation protocol which effectively enabled TOC
agents to propose, accept and reject offers. A negotiation strategy, called Strategy-PO (SPO), was
then derived so that the resulting solution is guaranteed to be Pareto-optimal (i.e. a win-win
situation) when an agreement is made. However, exhaustive searching, which lacks computational
efficiency, was employed to generate offers during negotiation. In addition, not all TOCs are
satisfied with reaching a Pareto-optimal agreement, but they may prefer to either exploit the
negotiation partner for a more favorable offer (i.e. a win-lose situation) or reach an agreement
within a few rounds of negotiations to reduce the administration cost (e.g. man-power,
communication costs, etc.). As a result, it is beneficial to both improve the computation efficiency
of SPO, and examine other potential negotiation strategies that can satisfy the particular needs of
different TOCs.
3

The objective of this paper is to show the feasibility of modeling the behavior of TOCs in a
schedule coordination negotiation. While developing a generic model for the coordination problem
is beyond the scope of this paper, three negotiation strategies and an efficient algorithm for offer
generation are proposed. Section 2 reviews the mathematical formulation of a schedule coordination
problem involving two TOCs. Section 3 puts forward an agent negotiation model. Section 4
examines the rationality of the negotiation behaviors through a set of simulation studies. Section 5
presents a hypothetical case study to explore the benefits and limitations of applying the proposed
setup for train planning in railway open markets. Section 6 delivers the conclusions.

2.

Schedule Coordination Problem

2.1. Assumptions
The schedule coordination problem described here involves the alignment of two passenger
train services Li and L j , operated by TOC- i and TOC- j respectively, at an interchange station

X through negotiation. It assumes that the train operators only share common information on train
traveling times. Sensitive data, such as cost rates, are only available to the operators themselves.
The model neglects the cost arising from the loss of punctuality of train services, which is
usually recovered by an agreed penalty charge when forming a contract. In addition, quadratic
function is used to model the relationship between expected passenger demand and waiting time at
the interchange station. While it may be argued that other functions are feasible, and perhaps more
accurate, quadratic functions are simple, and they have been employed to model passenger
expectation on waiting and traveling times in railways (Murata and Goodman, 1998). In addition,
regression analysis has been widely employed in transportation to obtain demand forecasts (Boyer,
1998). Thus, in practice, the required quadratic function may be generated from regression
techniques using data collected in surveys on passengers’ expectation.

4

2.2. Objective Function
The objective function for TOC- i running Li is defined in Equation (1).

max

Ri = ai Gi (ζ i , ζ j ) + ai Gi (ζ j , ζ i ) − Fi (ζ i ) for ζ i , ζ j ∈ {0, 1, 2, K}

(1)

Ri is the revenue improvement for TOC- i by coordinating its train service Li with service
L j , operated by TOC- j , at station X . Gi (ζ i , ζ j ) denotes the estimated number of passengers
transferring from Li to L j at X , when the commencement times of Li and L j are ζ i and

ζ j respectively. Similarly, Gi (ζ j , ζ i ) represents the expected passenger demand transferring
from L j to Li at X . ai is the average charge per passenger traveling with Li , and Fi (ζ i ) is
the cost of idle time of rolling stock for Li when the commencement time for Li is ζ i .
Let ζˆi be the release date of the rolling stock of Li . If Li commences at ζˆi , then the idle
cost of Li is zero. Also, let ci be the unit cost of idle time for Li . The idle cost is then modeled
in Equation (2).
Fi (ζ i ) = ci (ζ i − ζˆi ) for ζ i ≥ ζˆi

(2)

Let ti be the time required for Li to travel to X from the origin station, and d i be the
dwell time of Li at X , then the arrival time Ai and departure time Di of Li at X are
modeled in Equations (3) and (4) respectively. t j , d j , A j and D j can be similarly defined for
Lj .
Ai = ζ i + ti

(3)

Di = ζ i + ti + d i

(4)

The passenger waiting time at the interchange station, wij and w ji , for transferring to and
from L j and Li at X , are expressed in Equations (5) and (6) respectively. κ ij and κ ji refer to
the minimum time required to transfer to and from L j and Li at X . zij and z ji are obtained
5

by substitution with Equations (3) and (4) as zij = t j + d j − t i − κ ij and z ji = t i + d i − t j − κ ji .
wij = D j − Ai − κ ij = ζ j − ζ i + zij

(5)

w ji = Di − A j − κ ji = ζ i − ζ j + z ji

(6)

Gi (ζ i , ζ j ) and Gi (ζ j , ζ i ) , the expected passenger demands transferring between the two
services, are modeled in Equations (7) and (8). Gij* and G *ji are the maximum expected demands
and ŵij and ŵ ji are the waiting times when demands reach zero.
⎡ ⎛ζ −ζ + z
ij
j
i
Gi (ζ i , ζ j ) = G ⎢1 − ⎜
⎜
wˆ ij
⎢ ⎝
⎣

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

2

⎡ ⎛ζ −ζ + z
ji
i
j
Gi (ζ j , ζ i ) = G *ji ⎢1 − ⎜
⎜
wˆ ji
⎢ ⎝
⎣

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

2

*
ij

⎤
⎥ for 0 ≤ ζ j − ζ i + zij ≤ wˆ ij
⎥
⎦

(7)

⎤
⎥ for 0 ≤ ζ i − ζ j + z ji ≤ wˆ ji
⎥
⎦

(8)

The objective of TOC- i without considering the impacts to TOC- j is thus to maximize the
revenue improvement in Equation (1), subject to the constraints accompanied in Equations (1), (2),
(7), and (8). Similarly, the objective function for TOC- j can be generated by interchanging the
indices of i and j . However, since the TOCs must agree on the decision variables ζ i and ζ j
together, the individual optimal solutions may not be accepted by the other TOC, but are determined
through a negotiation process. In other words, the schedule coordination problem considered here
differs from conventional constrained optimization problems in that not only the optimal solution
needs to be solved, but also a set of high quality solutions are required for negotiation purpose.
2.3. Negotiation Protocol
Negotiation is defined as the exchange of offers in a finite number of rounds. The TOC agent
submitting the first offer is the initiator, while the agent submitting the second one is the responder.
An offer O k at round k is modeled in Equation (9), and it consists of the proposed
commencement times ζ ik and ζ jk of the initiator i and responder j respectively. The revenue
6

improvement (utility value) for TOC- i associated with O k is represented by Rik .
O k = {ζ ik , ζ jk }

(9)

The negotiation procedure is summarized in Figure 1. Both agents share a common action set
Ac ∈ {PROPOSE, ACCEPT, FAILURE}. In the first round of negotiation ( k = 1 ), the initiator

generates its optimal offer in Equation (1). If it exists, it is proposed to the responder. Otherwise, no
ˆ

action is taken. In all subsequent rounds, both agents evaluate the utility value and update O k ,
ˆ

which is the offer received that has the highest utility value Rik between the first round and the
most recent round ( k̂ corresponds to the round that that has the highest utility value). In addition,
the agent also computes the counteroffer O * using a negotiation strategy. If no offer is found, the
negotiation is terminated with action FAILURE. Where the offer exists, the agent proposes
ˆ

O k +1 = O * if Ri* > Rik , and accepts O k̂ otherwise.
2.4. Negotiation Strategies
2.4.1. Strategy-PO

Strategy-PO (SPO) was first proposed by Tsang and Ho (2006b), and its rationale is included
here for the sake of completeness of discussions. In this strategy, the feasible offers are arranged in
descending order of utility values, that is, for the initiator, R11 ≥ R13 ≥ ... ≥ R12 m−1 , and for the
responder, R22 ≥ R24 ≥ ... ≥ R22 m , where m denotes the ranking of the utility value.
SPO is intended to derive the Pareto-optimal solution. A solution is Pareto-optimal if there does
not exist any alternative solution which improves the utility values of all negotiating parties
(Ehtamo et al., 1996). In order to achieve Pareto-optimality, it requires both TOC agents to employ
SPO, and the proof has been given by Tsang and Ho (2006b).
2.4.2. Strategy-MIN

Suppose an agent has just received an offer O k . In Strategy-MIN (SMIN), the counteroffer O *
is derived from Equation (10), where O ′ and O ′′ are offers with utility values R′ and R′′ that
7

are found by Equations (11) and (12) respectively. Rik −1 is the utility value associated with the
previous offer O k −1 = {ζ ik −1 , ζ jk −1 } . R∂ζ i and R∂ζ j represent the utility values of the candidate
offers O∂ζ i = {ζ i , ζ jk −1 } and O∂ζ j = {ζ ik −1 , ζ j } respectively.
⎧O′ for R′ > R′′
O* = ⎨
⎩O′′ otherwise

(10)

R ′ = arg R∂ζ {min(Rik −1 − R∂ζ i )}

(11)

R′′ = arg R∂ζ j {min(Rik −1 − R∂ζ j )}

(12)

i

SMIN attempts to reduce the concession made from the most recent offer proposed by the agent
itself. Since the generated offers do not take the proponent’s requirements into consideration, agents
employing this strategy are expected to make fine steps of concession during negotiation.
2.4.3. Strategy-MAX
Suppose an agent has just received the offer O k = {ζ ik , ζ jk } . In Strategy-MAX (SMAX), the
counteroffer O * is also derived from Equation (10), but R′ and R′′ are found by Equations (13)
and (14) respectively. Rik is the utility value associated with the current offer O k . R∂ζ i and R∂ζ j
represent the utility values of the candidate offers O∂ζ i = {ζ i , ζ jk } and O∂ζ j = {ζ ik , ζ j }
respectively.
R′ = arg R∂ζ {max(R∂ζ i − Rik )}

(13)

R ′′ = arg R∂ζ j {max(R∂ζ j − Rik )}

(14)

i

SMAX attempts to maximize the difference of utility value from the most recent offer received
from the proponent agent. Since the generated offers are modified from the proponent’s offers,
which are likely to benefit to the proponent, agents employing this strategy are expected to make
coarse steps of concession during the negotiation.

8

3.

Algorithms for Generation of Offers

Exhaustive searching was proposed by Tsang and Ho (2006b) to generate offers to the
proponent. The algorithm intuitively generates all possible offers in the solution space and arranges
them in descending order of revenue improvement. This algorithm both imposes a high
computational demand, and the majority of offers are in fact not proposed because the size of the
solution space is usually much larger than the effective number of negotiation rounds.
In order to reduce the computation demand, a more efficient algorithm is employed in this study.
The first stage of the algorithm generates the optimal offer by Lemke’s Complementary Pivoting
Algorithm (LCPA) (Bazaraa et al., 1993), and the second stage adopts a heuristic searching
algorithm to generate a set of high quality solutions.
3.1. Lemke’s Complementary Pivoting Algorithm
The objective function in Equation (1) contains Gi (ζ i , ζ j ) and Gi (ζ j , ζ i ) which represents
the expected demands transferring between the train services. According to Equations (7) and (8),
these demands have domains defined by 0 ≤ ζ j − ζ i + zij ≤ ŵij

and 0 ≤ ζ i − ζ j + z ji ≤ wˆ ji

respectively. When both passenger waiting times are out of these ranges, the demands cease and the
utility value Ri

becomes zero. When either Gi (ζ i , ζ j ) or Gi (ζ j , ζ i ) is invalid (i.e.

ζ j − ζ i + zij < 0 ≤ −1 or ζ i − ζ j + z ji < 0 ≤ −1 ), it corresponds to the two situations of
unidirectional transfer. When both terms are valid, the transfer is bidirectional. In other words, the
optimal revenue improvement R * can be computed by Equation (15), where Ri→ j is the optimal
value for the problem Pi → j (unidirectional transfer from Li to L j ), R j →i is the optimal value
for the problem Pj→i (unidirectional transfer from L j to Li ), and Ri ↔ j is the optimal value for
problem Pi ↔ j (bidirectional transfer between Li and L j ). These three sub-problems are defined
in Table 1.
R * = max( Ri→ j , R j →i , Ri ↔ j )
9

(15)

When the integer constraints on ζ i and ζ j associated with Equation (1) are neglected, these
sub-problems can be expressed in the standard form for quadratic programming in Equation (16),
where x = [ζ i

ζ j ]T is the vector containing the decision variables. A summary of c , H , A

and b is given in Table 2.
min { f (x) = c T x +

1 T
x Hx : Ax ≤ b,x ≥ 0}
2

(16)

Although not all quadratic programming problems can be solved analytically, it has been shown
that if H is positive semi-definite, the problem can be reduced to a linear programming problem
supplemented by a complementary constraint, which is solved efficiently by Lemke’s
Complimentary Pivoting Algorithm (LCPA) (Bazaraa et al., 1993). For the special case of a 2× 2
matrix H , H is positive semi-definite if and only if h11 ≥ 0 , h22 ≥ 0 , h11h22 − h12 h21 ≥ 0 (where

hij is the element of H at row i and column j ). As the H -matrices for the sub-problems can
be shown to satisfy this condition, LCPA is used to generate the optimal solution for the relaxed
(non-integer) problems in Equation (1). Nevertheless, for the purpose of negotiation, it is still
necessary to generate a sequence of offers. To obtain such a set of potential offers, a heuristic
searching algorithm is proposed.

3.2. Algorithm for Strategy-PO
Instead of searching for the entire search space, this heuristic algorithm extracts only the portion
of solutions satisfying Equation (17). In other words, the revenue improvement of the generated
offers R is no less than (α × 100) % of the optimal solution R * .

R ≥ αR * , for α ∈ [0, 1]

(17)

The search is organized as a tree diagram as shown in Figure 2. The nodes at levels 1 and 2
correspond to the optimal solutions evaluated by LCPA. However, it should be noted that these
solutions may be infeasible because the integer constraints on ζ i and ζ j are neglected. To obtain
a set of solutions satisfying Equation (17), the integer constraints are considered in the nodes at
10

levels 3 and 4.

3.2.1. Evaluation at level 3 of search tree
At this level, ζ i is assigned (in ascending order) with an integer value to node indexed by

u = {1, 2, ...} . The objective is to determine the optimal solution among its leaf nodes. Since ζ i is
a constant at this level, the sub-problems in Table 1 are reduced to single-variable optimization
problems of ζ j coupled with linear constraints. These are easily solved by standard constrained
optimization techniques by finding the derivative of the cost function and comparing the utility
values at the local maximum and the boundary cases.
To avoid evaluating all instances of ζ i , nodes are pruned by using the heuristics depicted in
Figure 3. Each box represents the revenue improvement of a decision variable pair ζ i and ζ j . In
Figure 3a, the effects on revenue improvement associated with demands Gi (ζ i , ζ j ) and

Gi (ζ j , ζ i ) are shown. According to Equations (7) and (8), a unit increase in both ζ i and ζ j
results in no change in passenger demands. This forms the constant contours represented by the
dotted lines. Also, as the revenue improvement grows when passenger demand is increased, a rise in

Gi (ζ i , ζ j ) diagonally downwards (refer to Equation (7)) will contribute to an increase in revenue
improvement. Similarly, a rise in Gi (ζ j , ζ i ) diagonally upwards (refer to Equation (8)) will
contribute to an increase in revenue improvement. Similar sketch can be obtained in Figure 3b for
idle cost Fi (ζ i ) , when considering Equations (1) and (2).
The resulting effects of the three factors may either increase (+) or decrease (–) the revenue
improvement. However, for the problems Pi → j and Pi ↔ j , the center box with ζ i = ζ iu in Figure
3c (where ζ iu is the commencement time corresponding to one of the node u at level 3) is
considered. With the trends shown in Figures 3a and 3b, the utility value at the upper right diagonal
box is always lower because the demands are constant but the idle cost is increasing. Although the
11

change in the adjacent and lower diagonal boxes are uncertain, if these boxes are infeasible values
(i.e. beyond the boundary constraints), all columns beyond ζ iu will not contain any solution
satisfying the search criteria in Equation (17). In other words, all nodes ζ i > ζ iu may be pruned if
the condition shown in Figure 3c is detected.
Similarly, for problem Pj→i (Figure 3d), the entire column at ζ iu +1 has the revenue
improvement reduced, so that the columns beyond ζ iu can be pruned without the need of reaching
the boundary constraint.

3.2.2. Evaluation at level 4 of search tree
At this level, ζ i is inherited from the parent node at level 3, and ζ j is assigned (in ascending
order) with an integer value to node indexed by v = {1, 2, ...} . Since both values are constants at
this level, the utility of a node is directly computed by Equation (1).
To avoid evaluating all instances of ζ j , nodes are pruned when ζ j > ζ vj (where ζ iv is the
commencement time corresponding to one of the node v at level 4) if the revenue improvement

R v at node v has already violated Equation (17). The value of ζ iv is determined by comparing
against the boundary constraints of Pi → j , Pj→i and Pi ↔ j in Table 1, which can be determined by
Equations (18), (19) and (20) respectively.

ζ vj = wˆ ij + ζ i − zij

(18)

ζ vj = min{(ζ i + z ji ), (ζ i − z ji − 1)}

(19)

ζ vj = min{(ζ i + z ji ), ( wˆ ij − ζ i − zij )}

(20)

3.3. Algorithms for Strategy-MIN and Strategy-MAX
In these strategies, the initial offer proposed in round 1 can be generated by LCPA discussed
above. However, to ensure that the resulting offer is feasible (i.e. ζ i and ζ j satisfying the integer
constraints), the optimal offer is obtained by comparing the direct neighboring solutions of
12

O1 = {Dn(ζ i ), Dn(ζ j )} ,

O2 = {Dn(ζ i ) + 1, Dn(ζ j )} ,

O3 = {Dn(ζ i ), Dn(ζ j ) + 1} ,

and

O4 = {Dn(ζ i ) + 1, Dn(ζ j ) + 1} , where Dn(•) rounds down the value to the nearest integer. In other

words, O 1 = Oi , i = arg{max{Ri } | i = {1, 2, 3, 4}} .
For the subsequent offers, according to the definitions of SMIN and SMAX, the counteroffer

O * is obtained by comparing O ′ and O ′′ . Since O ′′ corresponds to minimizing/maximizing the
utility value by holding the commencement time ζ i constant for the sub-problems in Table 1, it
can be found by standard optimization techniques as discussed at level 3 of the search tree.
Similarly, as O ′ corresponds to minimizing/maximizing the utility value by holding ζ j constant,
it can also be obtained by standard optimization techniques.

4.

Simulation Setup and Results
The simulation set-up described below examines the performance of the strategies in terms of

their quality of solutions and the duration of negotiations. Five cases have been constructed
according to Table 3, and all combinations of strategy pairs are simulated in each case. If (S1 , S 2 )
denotes the strategies employed by TOC-1 and TOC-2, where S1 , S2 ∈ {SPO, SMAX, SMIN} , a
total of nine combinations are available.
The simulated cases represent scenarios from a spectrum of extreme conditions. In case 1, the
traveling time of train services are set up so that, without coordination, bidirectional transfer is
impossible. Case 2 is deliberately set up so that only unidirectional transfer can be achieved, even
when the train services are coordinated. In case 3, the release date of TOC-1 is set to a large value to
resemble the scenario when the two TOCs begin the negotiation with substantial operational
differences. Cases 4 and 5 examine the consequences when the idle cost of rolling stock is high and
low respectively.

13

4.1. Quality of Solutions
Figure 4 displays the frequency distribution of the quality of solutions. A ‘win-win’ solution
refers to an agreement that is Pareto-optimal. When the utility value of one TOC is improved at the
expense of the other one, the solution is considered as ‘win-lose’. On the other hand, when the
utility values of both TOCs are lower than the Pareto-optimal solution, these solutions are denoted
by ‘lose-lose’. Finally, ‘none’ refers to cases that are terminated without reaching any agreement.

4.1.1. Strategy-PO
The solutions obtained by (SPO, SPO) are used as the reference for the other pairs since these
solutions are by definition Pareto-optimal. While Figure 4 suggests that other strategy pairs may
also obtain the Pareto-optimal solution occasionally, it is important to note that the concession
curves (i.e. the sequence of proposed offers) of (SPO, SPO) are always monotonically decreasing.
An example is illustrated in Figure 5 where the introduction of SMIN causes the utility values of
both TOCs to ripple downwards. In other words, SPO always guarantees Pareto-optimality.

4.1.2. Strategy-MIN
Figure 4 also shows that the use of SMIN by at least one TOC usually results in either win-win
or win-lose solution. In SMIN, since the generation of potential offers is restricted by holding one
of the commencement time constant, the agent is only able to search within a limited set of offers.
This contrasts to SPO which is capable of selecting the next best offer from the entire solution space.
Therefore, SMIN has the risk of proposing (or revealing) a less favorable solution during the
negotiation. In the example depicted in Figure 5, although the offer {7, 5} contributes a lower
utility value to TOC-2, the utility value of its proponent is higher. As a result, TOC-1 prefers the
offer over the Pareto-optimal one {8, 5} .
Nevertheless, the frequency of reaching a sub-Pareto-optimal (i.e. win-lose/lose-loss) offer is
not exceedingly high. In addition, even if the negotiation ends with a sub-Pareto-optimal offer, the
quality of solution is usually close to the Pareto-optimal one. In this aspect, SMIN seems to be
14

capable of approximating the operation for SPO in most scenarios, but it introduces a small opening
of exploiting (and being exploited by) the negotiating partner.

4.1.3. Strategy-MAX
According to Figure 4, more than half of the negotiations involving SMAX are
sub-Pareto-optimal. Moreover, two negotiations have no solution. Thus, the results suggest that
SMAX is less favorable than SPO and SMIN in terms of the quality of solution attained.
Despite the similarities between SMAX and SMIN, there are now significantly fewer
negotiations leading to the Pareto-optimal solution when employing SMAX. Since SMAX uses the
proponent’s offer ( O k ) instead of the more favorable one ( O k −1 ) when generating the counteroffers,
it is less likely to reach the Pareto-optimal agreement.
When using the strategy pair (SMAX, SMAX), both agents may suffer from a reduction in
utility value because they are both manipulating the proponent’s offer to generate their counteroffers.
In other words, neither agent is consistently benefiting from the operation. Without any logical
modification of the counteroffers, the final agreement may eventually be unfavorable to both
parties.

4.2. Duration of Negotiation
Figure 6 shows the frequency distribution of the negotiation duration. ‘Equal’ refers to the same
number of rounds as the solution obtained by (SPO, SPO), while ‘faster’ and ‘slower’ correspond to
requiring fewer and more number of negotiation rounds respectively. Figure 7 shows the
distribution of the average negotiation round computed as percentage of the result obtained from
(SPO, SPO).

4.2.1. Strategy-PO
As shown in Figure 6, employing SMIN or SMAX usually improves the negotiation speed. In
fact, in the five simulated cases, (SPO, SPO) often requires a substantial number of rounds (up to
804) before the negotiations are settled. If exhaustive search was used in the simulation instead of
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LCPA with heuristic search, the simulation time would further be increased because an extensive
number of evaluations is needed (Table 4).

4.2.2. Strategy-MIN
According to Figure 6, about half of the negotiations employing SMIN complete the transaction
with fewer rounds. Since there is no need to propose the offers in monotonically decreasing order of
utility values, SMIN is likely to skip some of the intermediate solutions while still being able to
reach the Pareto-optimal or a sub-Pareto-optimal agreement. However, in the other half of the cases,
SMIN requires the same number of rounds as the reference negotiation. As a result, SMIN may also
be regarded as a good approximation to SPO in terms of negotiation duration.

4.2.3. Strategy-MAX
In Figure 6, almost all negotiations involving SMAX produce faster negotiation. The main
reason is that the proponent’s commencement time ( ζ j ) is usually unchanged as the counteroffer is
modified from the proponent’s offer. In other words, the proponent is more likely to accept the
counteroffer. Hence, the number of negotiation rounds is lowered.
The average number of negotiation rounds required by SMAX is usually lower than SMIN. In
Figure 7, when SMAX is employed as at least one of the strategies, the average number of
negotiation round required is only 20-80% of the result employing (SPO, SPO). On the other hand,
when SMIN is employed by one agent, the average round of negotiation required is about 80-90%.

4.3. Remarks
The simulation results find that SPO guarantees the Pareto-optimal solution, but it often requires
an extensive number of negotiation rounds during negotiation. Although the offer generation
process has already been improved using LCPA with heuristic searching algorithm, the large
number of negotiation rounds in practice is often infeasible since it will induce a large
administration cost (e.g. man-power and communication costs). The use of SMIN generally reduces
the number of negotiation rounds by introducing a small opening to exploit a win-lose or lose-win
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solution. SMAX further reduces the negotiation rounds, but it has the highest risks of reaching a
lose-lose agreement.

5.

Case Study
This section demonstrates how the developed simulation software and findings may be

employed as a tool for planning and evaluation in practice. However, it should be clearly stated that
the simulation data used below is hypothetically created and not collected from any official
organizations. Thus, the results only demonstrate the applicability of the simulation models but not
necessarily reflect any current situation. Through the following description, it is intended that the
potential benefits and limitations of the proposed agent negotiation model will be appreciated.

5.1. Background
In the UK, Network Rail is the infrastructure manager, and a number of passenger train
operating companies seek access to this network. Network Rail is responsible for managing 17
major interchange stations. An example is the Liverpool Lime Street station. Intercity services are
provided by TransPennine Express and Virgin Trains, while regional services are offered by Central
Trains and Northern Rail. A schematic diagram for the lines serviced by these operators is shown in
Figure 8. The intercity service providers compete in the northern England including cities at
Lancaster, Preston, Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds, York and Newcastle. On the other
hand,

the

regional

services

encounter

only

limited

competition

on

the

Liverpool-Manchester-Sheffield corridor.
As a consequence, the two regional service operators may consider coordinating their schedules
to attract an additional demand for the cross-regional services. This would create a yardstick
competition with the seamless intercity services. For example, the journey from Preston to
Birmingham via Virgin Trains takes about 1 hour 40 minutes while the trips from Preston to
Liverpool via Northern Rail and Liverpool to Birmingham via Central Trains are approximately 1
hour and 1 hour 45 minutes respectively. In other words, the minimum journey time for the
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coordinated service is 2 hour 45 minutes. If the combined train fares for the regional services are
lower than the intercity one, and the passenger waiting time is kept reasonably short, it is possible
that some passengers will use the coordinated service instead of the seamless one.

5.2. Setup
The schedule coordination problem at the Liverpool Lime Street station involving Northern Rail
and Central Trains is examined using the negotiation model presented in this study. It is assumed
that the simulation is conducted from the perspective of Northern Rail whose train planners attempt
to determine the operating conditions for its service from Preston to Liverpool if schedule
coordination with Central Trains is possible.
The scheduling problem is illustrated in Figure 9. TOC-1 and TOC-2 represent Northern Rail
and Central Trains respectively. Northern Rail operates a service from Preston to Liverpool which
requires a journey time of 60 minutes and a dwell time of 15 minutes at Liverpool station. On the
other hand, the service provided by Central Trains from Liverpool to Birmingham consists of a
journey time of 105 minutes and a dwell time of 10 minutes. The minimum transfer time between
the two services is 5 minutes. Since Liverpool Lime Street is the terminal station for the Northern
Rail’s service, the case shown in Figure 9a represents a unidirectional passenger transfer from
Northern Rail to Central Trains. In addition, according to the past timetabling experience, the
commencement time of the service operated by Central Trains is likely to be 70 minutes later than
the commencement time of the Northern Rail’s service. According to Equation (5), with

ζ j − ζ i = 70 , t j = 0 (Central Trains’ service departs directly from the interchange station), d j = 10 ,
ti = 60 , κ ij = 5 , the default passenger waiting time wij is computed to be 15 minutes.
Suppose the current average train fares for the Northern Rail and Central Trains services are
£8.00 and £17.00 respectively. These train fares are expected to give rise to a maximum demand of
50 passengers when the waiting time is zero, and the demand will cease when the waiting time
exceeds 30 minutes. Moreover, the current estimation of idle costs for the rolling stock of Northern
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Rail and Central Trains are £20/min and £25/min respectively. The base case for the situation
described is denoted as Case A in Table 5. Simulation of this case yields the probable outcome
derived by negotiation. Case B refers to the situation when Northern Rail attempts to increase the
passenger demand by reducing the average train fare by £2.00. Finally, Case C demonstrates an
example of bidirectional transfer if the same set of rolling stock is used for the backward journey as
shown in Figure 9b.
Having devised the situations intended for investigation, the train planners of Northern Rail can
generate results using agent negotiation. While it is possible to simulate the scenarios using all
combinations of strategy pairs, the assumption is that the proponent (i.e. Central Trains) will use
SPO to represent the fact that it has no intention to make any concession to Northern Rail. On the
other hand, SPO and SMAX are chosen for Northern Rail to obtain the expected best and worst
outcomes respectively. The simulation results are summarized in Table 6.

5.3. Results and Findings
5.3.1. Case A
The solution obtained in this case using the strategy pair (SPO, SPO) is {2, 70} , meaning that
Northern Rail is willing to postpone its service by 2 minutes, while Central Trains keep its
commencement time unchanged. The Pareto-optimal solution has reduced the waiting time by 2
minutes (from 15 to 13 minutes). With the balance between the income generated from an increased
passenger demand of 40.6 and the 2-minute idle cost of rolling stock, the overall revenue gained by
the stakeholder is found to be £289.89. On the other hand, the solution obtained from the strategy
pair (SMAX, SPO) is {7, 70} . As SMAX aims to reduce the negotiation time by sacrificing
Pareto-optimality, the commencement time for Northern Rail is further delayed to 7 minutes which
leads to a higher idle cost. Although the passenger demand has been increased further to 46.4 (i.e.
about 6 more passengers) due to a shorter waiting time of 8 minutes, the overall revenue gained is
lowered to £231.56. Nevertheless, since both simulated negotiations lead to a considerable gain in
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revenue, conducting a negotiation with Central Trains in practice seems to be beneficial.

5.3.2. Case B
The reduction of train fare has increased the revenue of Northern Rail to £292.80 using (SPO,
SPO) and £250.13 using (SMAX, SPO). Although this may encourage the stakeholder to lower the
train fare, the expected gain is not substantial (only £3 - £20). Thus, the stakeholder may retain the
basic train fare to avoid the additional administration cost of modifying the charging scheme.

5.3.3. Case C
The possibility of bidirectional transfer has provided a reasonable increase in revenue for
Northern Rail. Having an additional demand of almost 50 passengers in the backward journey,
Northern Rail is willing to postpone the commencement time by about 20 minutes instead of only 2
minutes in Case A.

5.3.4. Remarks
Based on the simulation results, the recommendation to Northern Rail is to explore the
possibility of schedule coordination with Central Trains. Preferably, the rolling stock should also be
used for the backward journey. However, the stakeholder should pay serious attention to the
possible errors in their estimation or prediction (e.g. passenger demand). It is also recommended
that Northern Rail should negotiate in a cautious manner if adequate time is available for
negotiation.

6.

Conclusions
We have presented an agent negotiation model for the schedule coordination problem in open

railway markets. The model consists of a simple protocol and the Train Operating Company (TOC)
agents are able to incorporate Strategy-PO (SPO), Strategy-MIN (SMIN) or Strategy-MAX
(SMAX). The offer generation problem is resolved using Lemke’s Complementary Pivoting
Algorithm (LCPA) with a heuristic searching algorithm, which is more efficient than exhaustive
search. Through the negotiation process, the TOC agents are able to decide whether coordinating
20

the schedules between the train services is favorable.
Simulations have been conducted to evaluate the Pareto-optimality and negotiation length. The
findings confirm that SPO guarantees a Pareto-optimal (win-win) agreement but requires the
highest negotiation demand. The performance of SMIN is similar to that of SPO but it introduces a
small opening to exploit the win-lose or lose-win solution. SMIN is thus suitable for ambitious
TOCs aiming to obtain a solution that is more favorable than the Pareto-optimal solution by
exploiting the benefits of the negotiating partner. For TOCs that are keen on obtaining a deal
quickly, SMAX is a fast means to complete a negotiation with a higher risk of reaching a lose-win
or lose-lose agreement.
Although the proposed model considers coordinating passenger train services, it may also be
applied to coordinating freight train services. Instead of using passenger demands in Equation (1),
freight demands (e.g. measured in tons) can be used. Nevertheless, since the relationship between
demands and waiting time for freight consignments may be significantly different from that of
passenger services, and extra costs are usually associated with handling the transfer of
consignments, the objective function may become more complicated. In fact, the objective function,
even for passenger train coordination, can be more complex than the model presented in this paper
when TOCs wish to consider the dependency cost (e.g. train delays of other TOCs) or to model
passenger demand more accurately using non-quadratic functions. In such case, a different
algorithm is required to generate the sequence of offers, even though the agent modeling and the
definitions on negotiation strategies remain applicable. Further research on devising more complex
and generic objective function (hence algorithm) will greatly improve the usability of the model.
In addition, the model has considered schedule coordination involving neither more than 2
TOCs nor a set of regular services on different headways. Furthermore, the need for coordinating
trains with multiple trains at multiple platforms, and the granting of track access rights by the
Infrastructure Manager (IM) have not been considered in this study. It is therefore not our intention
to apply the model to resolve any practical problems currently experienced by the railway open
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markets, but to demonstrate how the objectives and behavior of the railway stakeholders can be
captured by agent modeling. Further development based on the proposed model is believed to be a
valuable tool to assist the planning of policy makers before the actual negotiation is conducted.
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Table 3 Simulation Setup

Travel
Station
Idle Cost
Average
Commencement
Time from Dwell
Rates
Train Fare
Time (min)
Origin
Time
(£/min)
(£/person)
(min)
(min)
c2
a1
a2
t1
t2 d1 d 2
Case c1
ζˆ1
ζˆ 2
1
2
3
4
5

50
50
50
250
1

60
60
60
60
60

7
7
60
7
7

5
5
5
5
5

15
15
15
15
15

22
22
22
22
22

20
20
20
20
20

30
30
30
30
30

5
1
5
5
5

7
1
7
7
7

Passenger
Max.
Min.
Waiting
Demand Transfer
Time
(persons) Time (min)
(min)
G12* G 21* κ 12 κ 21 ŵ12 ŵ21
100
100
100
100
100

80
80
80
80
80

2
2
8
2
2

2
2
8
2
2

20
20
20
20
20

20
20
20
20
20

Table 4 Comparison of Computation Requirement between Exhaustive Search and LCPA
with Heuristic Search
Dimension of ζ i and ζ j
Number of Nodes Evaluated
LCPA with Heuristic Search
Exhaustive Search
( α = 0.8 )
60
3600
48
120
14,400
105
240
57,600
682
480
230,400
2255

Table 5 Simulation Setup for Schedule Coordination at Liverpool Lime Street Station
Commencement Average Train Max. Demand Idle Cost Rates
time (min)
Fare (£/person)
(persons)
(£/min)
Case
Description
*
*
ˆ
ˆ
ζ1
ζ2
a1
a2
G12
G 21
c1
c2
0
70
8
17
50
0
20
25
A Unidirectional transfer
Default schedules lead to
waiting time of 15 minutes
B Unidirectional transfer
0
70
6
17
70
0
20
25
Reduced train fare to
increase passenger demand
C Bidirectional transfer
20
0
8
17
50
50
20
25
Same rolling stock is used
for the backward journey
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Table 6 Simulation Results for Schedule Coordination at Liverpool Lime Street Station
Strategy Pair
Case A
Case B
Case C
Solution
(SPO, SPO)
{2, 70}
{3, 70}
{39, 0}
{ ζ 1 , ζ 2 }/min
(SMAX, SPO)
{7, 70}
{7, 70}
{40, 0}
Revenue gained by TOC-1
(SPO, SPO)
289.89
292.80
359.11
R1 (£)
(SMAX, SPO)
231.56
250.13
344.44
Revenue gained by TOC-2
(SPO, SPO)
789.56
999.60
1570.61
R2 (£)
(SMAX, SPO)
690.39
1105.38
1581.94
Number of negotiation
(SPO, SPO)
147
167
19
rounds
(SMAX, SPO)
47
57
14
(SPO, SPO)
13
12
11
Waiting time L1 → L 2
(SMAX, SPO)
8
8
10
(min)
(SPO, SPO)
4
Waiting time L 2 → L1
(SMAX, SPO)
5
(min)
(SPO, SPO)
40.6
58.8
42.3
Demand for L1 → L 2
(SMAX, SPO)
46.4
65.0
44.4
(persons)
(SPO, SPO)
49.1
Demand for L 2 → L1
(SMAX,
SPO)
48.6
(persons)
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5

STATION INDEX
PST: Preston
LLS: Liverpool Lime Street
BNS: Birmingham New Street

